We continue to familiarize our readers with the structure of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People and the balance of power within it. The first part of this series is here, and the subsequent parts are here and here.

‍The 1997 crisis and the split in the Mejlis between supporters of Mustafa Dzhemilev and the “Group of 16” occurred precisely because of financial opacity and allegations of corruption.

‍In Ukraine, the Qurultay and the Mejlis were not legally recognized institutions until April of this year, so they never had any official accounts (and therefore no clear financial reporting). However, the organization consisted of dozens of administrators at the central office in Aqmescit (Simferopol) on Schmidt Street and hundreds of local and regional Mejlis branches, which at any given time employed up to 2,500 people. All of this required constant funding. In 1992, the Qurultay established the “Crimea” Charitable Foundation. It became a legal entity with bank accounts, and the Mejlis’s property was registered in its name. However, formally speaking, the “Crimea” Foundation was a private organization consistently overseen by Mustafa-ağa’s trusted representative, Mejlis member Riza Shevkiev. The foundation’s budgets were not disclosed under the pretext of protecting national institutions from Russian influence. Most of the funds de facto managed by the Mejlis prior to the occupation of Crimea came from various sources: donations from businesspeople, budget funds allocated to the Crimean Republican Committee on Nationalities, and Turkish state aid. 

‍Leaks from Russian intelligence agencies following the annexation reveal that Turkey allocated approximately one and a half million dollars annually to fund the organization’s activities. This is a rather modest sum given the number of people involved. However, once again, the lack of legal recognition for the Mejlis still makes it impossible to determine who worked on a volunteer basis and who was paid a salary.

‍Of the many instances of the Mejlis’s collaboration with businesspeople, let’s recall two. 

‍A few years before the occupation of Crimea, Lenur Islyamov, the owner of an automotive and logistics business, and Ibrahim Araj, a Turkish chemical manufacturer, became involved in resolving the Mejlis’s financial issues. The former initiated a host of changes, establishing a protocol service and requiring written records of all decisions made by the national body; thanks to his ATR television channel, he also broadcast the first live transmission of the Qurultay, which became the biggest political spectacle for the Crimean Tatars. Islyamov does not disclose the costs associated with the Mejlis. 

‍Turkish businessman Araj issued a single check for $100,000, did not receive an expense report, caused a scandal, and disappeared from the lives of both the Mejlis and all Crimean Tatars.

‍After the occupation of the peninsula, financial leadership passed to the young businessman Rustem Umerov. People began calling him “the grandson” — due to the extraordinary trust Mustafa Dzhemilev placed in him. It was “the grandson” who was responsible for housing those members of the Mejlis and delegates to the Qurultay — whom the Russians had forced out of the peninsula after 2014 — in an elite residential complex in the Pechersk district of Kyiv. The Turkish state fund TIKA provided the funds for the purchase of the homes, but they are registered under the Crimean National Welfare Fund. Formally, Felix Karaev heads the fund, but the de facto leader of most of Umerov’s projects is the now quite well-known Lenur Mambet — Umerov’s trusted associate. With each career move by the “grandson,” his team has increasingly taken control of processes within the Mejlis and surrounding it. 

‍However, following its legalization in April, the Mejlis is set to receive the status of a public institution, at which point its funds will be managed through official accounts. The model for the future structure is currently the source of the greatest controversy. One faction within the Mejlis wants to establish an executive body to oversee its finances. At least three members of the Mejlis are categorically opposed to this model, as they view it as nonsensical: the Mejlis is already the executive body of the Qurultay, and creating an executive body within an executive body seems, in their opinion, absurd. They believe the goal of this initiative is to place budgetary control in the hands of people who are not members of the Mejlis. Meanwhile, the most creative idea regarding the financing of national institutions was put forward by one of Refat Chubarov’s current deputies — Ilmi Umerov. This is essentially a reworking of the American Revolutionary slogan “no taxation without representation.” Umerov proposed the formula “no representation without contributions” to the Crimean Tatar community. Crimean Tatars would be required to make a monthly voluntary contribution (a national tax) to support their own government. This is intended to increase the people’s civic responsibility and protect the Mejlis from financial dependence. Ilmi Bey’s colleagues did not take the idea seriously. They did not even consider it, so it remained nothing more than a historical anecdote about national taxes