Photo: Official website of the President of Ukraine

Regardless of how the story of the elimination of the independence of anti-corruption bodies ends, the mention of the names of two of the three Crimean Tatars in parliament who voted for Law 12414 will remain with us for a long time. When a people first loses its state, then its subjectivity, and finally all its civil rights, and is given the status of “traitor,” the trauma can take decades or centuries to heal, with constant justifications and new accusations. The individual ceases to have value in the eyes of the people. Individuality no longer has right to exist. And every step taken by each representative is projected onto the entire community. The people cease to be a community of passionate individuals and diverse groups. They lose the right to be a people, lose the right to a complex internal structure. They become a tribe where everyone is responsible for everyone else, led by a chief. Add to this a war of annihilation, where each side dehumanizes the other, and collective responsibility becomes the norm.

It was these factors that once forced the early members of the Mejlis to adhere to one principle: politically, the people support only the People's Movement in Ukraine, because of:

1. The independence.

2. The Western choice.

3. The full restoration of the political rights of the Crimean Tatars.

The support of an entire people for one — almost flawless — political force was to be a demonstration of its loyalty to the country and the state in an anti-state environment, as well as a sign of a single powerful voice that should be reckoned with, despite its numerical minority in Crimea.

For almost 10 years (from 1991 to the early 2000s), this policy was successful in terms of image but empty in terms of achievements. Subsequently, various opposition groups began to accuse the Mejlis of failing to address the urgent issues of the people: rehabilitation, land, toponyms, and autonomy. Some large-scale achievements, such as self-return and the rapid acquisition of Ukrainian citizenship, were quickly forgotten. It was only in 2019, already in exile in Kyiv, that the Mejlis dared to change its formula. Since then, Crimean Tatars have been able to run for any political force, as long as it is not pro-Russian.

And the Crimean Tatar youth, who had grown old (without having had time to grow up), still had dreams of radically reforming the “moldy” Mejlis. These young people, now in their thirties, grew tired of waiting for their turn amid the long occupation of Crimea and the absence of elections to the Kurultai and local Mejlis. They wanted to quickly put to use the managerial skills they had acquired in the business schools of North London and leadership courses in project management. And almost every member of the new wave of ambitious Komsomol members began to look for ways to enter politics: from monopolizing the representation of the legend of the dissident movement, Mustafa Dzhemilev, to joining all-Ukrainian post-Komsomol projects.

And now, the long and dignified past of the people has been called into question by a single vote. Technologically and, in some cases, deliberately. Now, few people remember the position of the Crimean Tatars in 1991 in favor of Ukrainian independence, in 1994–1995 during the confrontation with President Meshkov, in 2003 during Russia's provocations on Tuzla Island, during the Orange Revolution — corridors to Crimea for Yushchenko and an unprecedented percentage of votes in three rounds for southeastern Ukraine, during the signing of the Kharkiv agreements and the Revolution of Dignity. Finally, the position of the Crimean Tatars during the occupation of Crimea, recorded by journalists around the world, allowed Ukraine to be unequivocally supported in the question of whose Crimea it is.

The leaders of the Crimean Tatars have not only passed through all the key points of Ukraine's recent history with dignity, but often with sacrifice. And now, for the first time, we have a situation where our representatives have taken an anti-European step. And any arguments that formally only Akhtem Chiygoz (who did not support Law 12414) can be the representative of the Crimean Tatars in parliament because he is the deputy chairman of the Mejlis do not work.

There is a political myth based on legend, and there is a political reputation, the mark of quality of which is given by the media community. The first is about Mustafa Dzhemilev, an icon of dissident style, and the second is about Tamila Tasheva, who for many years headed CrimeaSOS and the Office of the President of Ukraine in Crimea. The media community considers them to be the voices of the indigenous people, who have always been on the side of light...

When a “dog wedding” began on various social networks, with only these two names out of 263 being criticized, I was accused of manipulation and distortion for an ironic text stating that “we are traitors with experience dating back to 1683.” The opinion leaders of Ukrainian Facebook and Twitter came up with a formula, which I will take the liberty of calling Pavlo Kazarin's formula, when he wrote a critical text addressed to Eurosolidarity and Goncharenko: “We criticize the EU because no one expected anything (good) from the Servants.” The same applies here — we publicly and personally condemn Dzhemilev and Tasheva because no one expected anything worthwhile from the rest of the 261 MPs. The position is understandable, romantic, and very dangerous. A fair question arises: Who decided that dog food has become even tastier? Who beatified Mustafa-Aga and Tamila-Khanum?

This is a question that Ukrainian society will answer after the war. When it will be possible to analyze whether the elections were “for fun” or whether collective responsibility for the votes of two deputies was placed on the Crimean Tatar people. However, there is an urgent question for the Crimean Tatars' internal homework.

How long should it be taboo to talk about the fact that 82-year-old Mustafa-aga has long since ceased to have any political initiative during voting? For 10 years now, his political position has been corrected by Rustem Umerov. A talented negotiator and political Jack Sparrow, capable of maneuvering out of the most difficult situations. No one knows the nature of this relationship for sure, but in backroom jokes, one could hear the nickname “grandson” and various hypotheses about the sources of trust of a strong political prisoner in a young man from the white-collar class.

As for Tamila Khanum, her career as an activist and civil servant is indeed almost flawless. However, the best official, capable of implementing the best state policies, is often not a good politician. This is especially true when compared to the Crimean Tatar movement, which was managerially talentless but politically robust and romantic. Such topics can be explained more professionally by political and social psychologists, Olga Dukhnych or Oleg Pokalchuk. However, I would not expect strong political views from a person who, for the past six years, has reverently pronounced “Volodymyr Oleksandrych” and later “Rustem Enverych.”

Flattery is not a quality that allows a person to stand firm on matters of principle in opposition to political loyalty, even in democratic regimes. The game of Realpolitik and the effectiveness of 5-6 managers is a global pandemic. However, over 200 years of modern political thought in the free world, humanity has survived thanks to isolated romantics or unyielding personalities with a statesmanlike mindset who found the strength not to get lost among the oligarchs and lumpen-populists. Where these two types of personalities come from — I dare not guess.

However, there is only one conclusion from the above: an entire people, an indigenous people, an exiled people cannot sit for decades in a political limbo, where their romantic position makes them a dissident people, eternally in opposition and subject to political punishment. But if its leaders begin to cooperate with the authorities, the people are branded as conformists and traitors.

Only the tiresome word “institutionalization” of relations between the indigenous people and the state can be the salvation for the Crimean Tatars. Its representative body, the Mejlis, must finally be officially recognized, and the head of the Mejlis and at least his deputies must not be members of governments or deputies at any level. Their task is to be official representatives of the people, so that an experienced media professional such as Kateryna Kobernyk is not tempted to equate the position of an individual, albeit legendary, Crimean Tatar with the position of all Crimean Tatars.

Because few people are interested in the fact that currently only the head of the Mejlis and, at the same time, the head of the World Congress of Crimean Tatars, Refat Chubarov, has the right to represent the people. In the context of war and occupation of Crimea, it is impossible to re-elect him, but due to a misunderstanding with Poroshenko in 2019, Refat Bey ceased to be a deputy and de facto adheres to the proposed rule: the head of the representative body of the Crimean Tatars is free from party discipline or direct political influence from the current government. Even if he is not free, he does not vote on issues that could jeopardize the reputation of the people.