By now there’s no doubt that the first days of June this year saw a major escalation of this war. Amid massive Russian strikes by attack UAVs, ballistic- and cruise missiles all over Ukraine - many of these targeting apartment buildings, and thus civilians - on 1 June, Ukraine hit back on the Russia’s bomber fleet. One can discuss the effects and count the number of bombers involved up and down, but the fact is that in the only attack involving them ever since (flown on 6 June), the Russians were able to scratch together only five operational Tu-95MS’, and had to ‘reinforce’ these with two Tu-160s (both were releasing Kh-101 cruise missiles).

In turn, the Ukrainians continued their campaign of strikes by attack UAVs and long-range land-attack missiles on factories of the Russian defence sector. From memory, over the last two weeks, they’ve devastated a factory making chips, a factory making attack UAVs, a factory manufacturing rocket motors for ballistic missiles, the Kirstall fuel depot at Engels-2 Air Base (Saratov), then the largest UAV factory in Russia (Kronshtat JSC), a Swiss-owned EuroChem fertiliser- and the NAK Azot factories in Novomoskovsk… the last night the Ukrainians also hit the Kazan Gunpowder Factory (manufacturing explosives for Iskander ballistic missiles, Kalibr cruise missiles, and artillery shells), and the Ukrainians launched one or two attacks by UAVs hidden in train wagons to destroy two trains carrying dozens of armoured vehicles for the Russian army.

Additionally, in the Klintsi area (outside Bryansk) the Ukrainians have managed to hit at least one transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) for Iskander ballistic missiles (killing Lieutenant-Colonel Oleg Nystrov, battalion commander of the 26th Missile Brigade and eight others in the process), and that ‘in the field’; plus, possibly another Iskander TEL at Bryansk Air Base (the Russians are reporting a ‘helicopter’ as hit, but that thingy blew up ‘like an ammunition depot’). Finally, Ukrainians hit the Morozovsk Air Base outside Rostov, and Savasleyka Air Base (home base of the Russia’s MiG-31K-fleet: these are jets releasing Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile), and claims to have destroyed one MiG and one Su-30 or Su-34.

Such attacks are possible primarily because the Ukrainian armed forces are starting them by ‘drilling SAM-corridors’ through the Russian air defences - and that in several areas along the international border, and along the frontline. As far as can be assessed on basis of publicly available materials, the Russian units operating Buk SAM-systems have suffered quite some attrition over the last two-three weeks.

´In retaliation’, the Russians continued striking civilian objects all over Ukraine: Kyiv was heavily hit, Kherson too, but the heaviest hit was Kharkiv, which on 5 June found itself exposed to a massive barrage including almost everything the Russians have in their arsenal: ballistic- and cruise missiles, artillery rockets and S-300-missiles (fired in ballistic mode), and UMPK glide bombs (including new models with range of 95km), plus dozens of attack UAVs…

A still from a video clearly showing a Russian strike on a tall apartment building in Kharkiv, early on 5 June

There are only three known exceptions from the Russian practice of targeting civilians. One was a strike that set a warehouse in Odesa afire, on 2 June. Another was the Penoboard factory for insulation materials, in Ternopil, hit on 5 June. On 6 June, a well-coordinated multi-missile Russian strike (apparently including Iskanders or Kinzhals, and Kh-101s, all of which came in within less than a minute) heavily hit the Motor Repair Plant in Lutsk, an enterprise specialised in overhauls and repairs of jet engines.

For its part, the PSU has, finally, managed a special feat: on 7 June, as its figther-bombers were running air strikes on Russian ground forces in the Tjotkino area (south-western Kharkiv), deploying ASM-250 Hammer guided bombs, an ‘enterprising’ Russian Su-35-pilot attempted to intercept them (read: too much testosterone) - only to fly into a well-set-up ambush. His jet was shot down by a single AIM-120B medium range air-to-air missile, fired by an Ukrainian F-16AM, and crashed south of Korenevo: as far as is known, the plot ejected safely.

Wreckage of the Russian Su-35 still smouldering after its crash in a field south of Korenevo, on 5 June 2025.

….and that’s all ‘just a superficial summary’: obviously, most of these operations can - and must - be discussed separately, with more attention to detail. But, there’s so much going on, just collecting all the details is taking time. Thus, please have some (more) patience with us: we do intend to get back to some of them, over the following days. For this morning, lets have a closer look at developments on the frontlines and elsewhere.

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Sumy/Kursk

As reported several times already, the Russia’s ‘spring/summer’ offensive of this year is meanwhile in full swing. It’s ‘just’ not characterised by ‘major mechanised attacks’ in the form one is usually associating with ‘the Russian way of war’: one of multiple motor-rifle- and tank-divisions breaching the frontline and then driving ‘deep’ into the rear. The Russians simply do not have the capability to conduct such operations - neither in terms of ‘armoured vehicles’, nor in terms of military skills. They do have plentiful of ‘troops’ to waste, though. Correspondingly, their ‘small’ infantry assaults are continued relentlessly.

One prong of this offensive can meanwhile be clearly identified in the Sumy Oblast of Ukraine, where the Russians are pushing with everything available - and supported by intensive air strikes. One of these dropped eight bombs on Kostiantynivka. Notably: two of these actually hit the village. Soon after a Russian assault occupied the completely demolished place. Ukrainians withdrew: it’s pointless to suffer casualties while trying to hold a pile of ruble. The main street is only 1300 meters long but the Russians managed to find three flags to show they took control of it. The Russians then conducted an airstrike on Kindrativka, the next village 3 km away. This time, all three bombs hit in the middle of that village, destroying private homes.

Ukrainian drones attack Russians when they move into Oleksiivka. Russia attacks Ukrainian positions south of Oleksiivka and Andriivka. Sumy is 18 km away.

Surprisingly enough, Sysrky didn’t manage to demlish the 156th Brigade by sending it to the Sumy Oblast in peacemeal condition: instead, it’s fighitng there as a complete formation. Indeed, the156th Brigade posted a video showing its guns shelling Russians 600 meters east of Yablunivka. Hopefully, they weren’t actually firing with three guns from one location

As mentioned above, an Su-35 was shot down 6 km southwest of Koronevo and 16 km from the Ukrainian border. We’ll get back to this clash with more details in a separate update.

A Russian position at the cultural center in northern Tyotkino is hit by an airstrike. Russian positions 4 km east of the cultural center are cleared. It’s unclear if any Russians were in those positions.

Russians from the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade were captured.

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Chasiv Yar

While the Russians meanwhile captured all of Chasiv Yar, north of the ruined town the had been static for three months, before the Russians managed an advance of 1,800 metres.

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Toretsk

A nighttime Russian rocket attack west of Yablunivka and a Russian airstrike north of Toretsk. Russian drones supported their advance towards Dyliivka. There were no reports of excessive losses during Ukraine’s withdrawal from the Zoria-Romanivka cauldron.

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Pokrovsk

Russia’s Rubicon drone team hits a Ukrainian tank in Mykolaivka. Russia uses thermobaric rockets near Shevchenko. The western end of Malynivka is bombed by Russia. Despite the bombardments, Russia was unable to advance in this sector this week.

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Andriivka

Russian positions in Bahatyr were bombarded. Ukraine is still in the northern half of Bahatyr but they lost the village of Odradne.

Oleskiivka is shelled and then assaulted by the Russians. The 46th Brigade attacked Russian forces that reached the village and eliminated their assault.

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Komar

A treeline north of Komar was bombed by the Russians, as was Komar itself. Fedorivka was bombarded by artillery and thermobaric rockets before Russian troops entered it and raised their flags. The Russian bombardment of Komar continued all the while during the assault on this village.

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Kherson

The Kherson Regional Administration building was bombed twice within 15 minutes. The 15 minute delay in the second attack was likely an attempt to kill emergency workers. Artillery and drone attacks followed, damaging a post office warehouse, supermarket and residential buildings.

A mystery weapon with a 100 kg warhead hit a portion of the railroad tracks elevated over swampy ground 1300 meters south of the Dnieper river.

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Crimea

On 3 June, the Ukrainians attacked the Crimean bridge for the third time. Like the airfield attacks, this operation was developed over 18 months. The Marichka naval drone has been attacking Russian surface ships for over two years. This time it was loaded with 1100 kg of explosives and attacked the base of the vehicular bridge. There was some minor damage to the surface of the road. The extent of the damage to the base is unknown but the bridge was open to traffic soon after.

Soon after, the leader of the Crimea Tatar people warned Russians to leave Crimea before it’s too late.

Russia celebrated the 7th anniversary of the opening of the Kerch bridge by, surprisingly, showing videos of its construction and Putin driving a truck with his shirt on.

Trucks were searched entering Crimea at Chonhar, north of the peninsula. Trucks were also denied entry to the Kerch bridge. It’s uncertain how long these heightened security measures will last. They’ve had them before, as seen from July 2024, but 100% vehicle checks are hard to maintain and over time they are reduced.

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Black Sea

Russia’s ships in the Black Sea are constantly breaking down. When inspected, it was found that most of the breakdowns were caused by the crews. When breakdowns happen, the scheduled work and combat duties are slowed. Over 50 minor incidents occurred on the submarines Kolpino and Krasnodar in a year. The most common type of incident was a leak on the fuel cylinder. Loose lubricator drives and gearbox failures are also common. Junior officers are believed to be the source of most of the sabotage.

In March, Ukraine resumed rail ferry service from Chernomorsk to Batumi, Georgia across the Black Sea. They plan to start another rail ferry between Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi Seaport and Pot, Georgia.

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Survival in a Drone War

After watching 5,000 videos a researcher found that targets had a 67% survival rate if they were in dense forests or buildings, a 92% chance of dying if they were in the open, and smoke increased survival chances by 32%. This means if you were in dense woods and covered by smoke from a burning vehicle or a smoke grenade you had a 99% chance of survival. These figures are for all the videos he watched and doesn’t mention whether EW or fiber optics were involved.

Armored vehicles provided protection but if the vehicle was disabled and the crew dismounted they then had a 33% chance of survival if they made it into a building or dense woods, or an 8% survival rate if they dismounted in the open.

Being detected in the open didn’t matter if the target was on foot, on a motorcycle or on top of an armored vehicle. They all had the same 92% chance of dying. Being in a vehicle still matters, though, because it reduces the time a target will be in an open field. Three soldiers on motorcycles might theoretically be attacked by one drone, likely killing one soldier while the other two could cross the field before more drones are launched. Three soldiers on foot might be attacked by three separate drones while trying to cross that same open field in the same amount of time.

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Rates of Advance

There are a lot of Ukrainian mistakes that resulted in the unnecessary loss of territory, life and property. A different perspective, though, is the rate of the Russian advance.

During the Somme offensive in WW1, the French and British advanced 80 meters per day. From February 2024 to April 2025 Russia advanced from Avdiivka to Pokrovsk 135 meters per day. From November 2024 to June 2025 they averaged 50 meters a day around Kupiansk. Since January 2024, Russia has captured less than 5,000 square kilometers (a 70 km x 70 km square).

In the fall of 2022, Ukraine advanced 7400 meters a day at Kharkiv and 590 meters a day at Kherson. During the 2023 Summer offensive they moved forward at just 90 meters per day.

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Russia

Engels-2 and Dyagilevo air bases, a fuel depot, and a missile and aviation plant were all struck on the same night by conventional strike drones. The Bryansk air base was also struck as was an Iskander launch site in Bryansk.

A chemical plant in the Tula region was hit a couple days later.

A fire broke out in a Topol missile factory, burning 400 square meters in a workshop where high-performance diesel engines were built.

What was likely the upper stage of a Chinese rocket enters the atmosphere by the Russian-Kazakhstan border. There was speculation that it might have been a failed Oreshnik IRBM.

Russia is upgrading its rail infrastructure on the Finnish and Estonian borders. This is in addition to the military infrastructure it is building on the Finnish border. The belief is that Russia expects to shift troops to these regions once the fighting in Ukraine is completed.

In Irkutsk, there were very long lines of trucks being inspected. One truck driver said he was stopped three times for inspections in Siberia.

Anti-aircraft weapons were found in a container in Poland.

A Russian citizen was sentenced to 18 years in prison for trying to bomb the head of a defense company.

From 2022 to 2024, over 22,600 court cases were filed to declare individuals missing or deceased. Since the beginning of 2025 there have been over 26,000 court cases.

The 15th Motor Rifle Brigade, based in Samara suffered 7,436 confirmed dead and 5,253 confirmed missing. They had a peacetime strength of 2,000. A full strength brigade would have 3-5,000 troops. 89% of the casualties were enlisted and 1% were officers.

Major Russian export companies sent less metal and oil products by train due to reduced demand. Iron and steel is 5% of Russia’s economy but they are also shipping less product due to reduced demand. Aluminum production is being reduced by 250,000 tons because the high cost is reducing demand. Trade between China and Russia is down 7.5%. There is less demand to build and invest in businesses because of the 21% interest rates on loans. Russian Railways planned to spend 40% less on building and maintenance because of high interest payments and will now reduce spending by another 3.5%. A lot of railroad employees have been mobilized or left for higher paying jobs in the defense industry. Defense shipments have priority over commercial shipments and rail cargo is headed for China and India instead of high-margin markets of Europe. Overall, Russian cargo volumes fell by 9.4% in May compared to the previous year. This is the third month in a row that Russian rail cargo has declined.

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(…to be continued…)

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This text is published with the permission of the author. First published here.

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