Illusions and Realities of ‘Cross-Border Incidents’, Part 2

Tom Cooper

Tom Cooper

13.05.2025

Illusions and Realities of ‘Cross-Border Incidents’, Part 2

(…continued from Part 1…)

***

7 May 2025, Part II

Compared with conditions of April-May 2025, back in February 2019 the situation between India and Pakistan was ‘simple’. At least from the point of view of the establishment in Islamabad. Following a mediocre IAF air strike on terrorist camps, the PAF shot down one Indian MiG-21 interceptor. Arguably, during the same clash, the PAF almost certainly lost an F-16, too (sorry, but there are videos showing ‘two parachutes’ and civilians reporting ‘two parachutists’, too). However, the mountaineous area in question was easy to cordon-off by the ISI: whatever evidence was available for the PAF loss, was quickly removed. Moreover, allies in the USA and elsewhere rushed to the help of ‘holy Pakistani F-16s’, and the affair ended with an official ‘1 to 0 for Pakistan’.

The facts like that the PAF not only probably lost that F-16, but had to abandon its own retaliation strikes on India when realising the IAF is… perhaps not really ‘ready’, but still ‘present in sufficient numbers’ to be dangerous for most of PAF’s formations, to force the Pakistanis to abort their missions – was conveniently swept under a carpet.

Result: Islamabad was capable of avoiding disgrace.

After the IAF air strikes of early morning of 7 May 2025 – and despite claiming ‘5 IAF fighter bombers shot down’ – this was not the case. Sure, both the official Islamabad and the Pakistani public, not to talk about that in the People’s Republic of China, and thus much of the social media – were ‘in delirium’ over the ‘victory over India’s ‘invincible Rafales’. However, at home, the ISI and thus the establishment had to face fierce reactions (outright ‘rage’) from their own jihadists, so many of whom were killed. Sure, here in ‘the West’, we might think that ‘jihadists are disposable’. And, perhaps much of the ISI’s top is thinking that way, too. However, they also know: they can’t ever dare ever again walking out to the street if not ‘paying their respects’ to the jihadists they’ve created. This is obvious alone from the fact that the Pakistan Armed Forces rushed so many of their officers to funerals of top jihadists killed in IAF air strikes.

Besides: who can say if not some of ISI’s officers were killed, too?

Finally, there was that issue of ‘recovering the deterrent’.

One way or the other, ‘this time’ Islamabad ‘had to retaliate’ against India. During the evening of 7 May, the Pakistani Armed Forces thus began launching dozens, then hundreds of attack UAVs into India. The number and types are not entirely clear: official New Delhi was talking about ‘300-400’ (that were shot down), some claimed over 500. Identified types were such like the Yiha III and Songar. It is possible – even likely – that the Pakistanis combined these with volleys from Fateh-1 multiple rocket launchers (reported range: some 120-140km; essentially, these are comparable in function to the Russian-made BM-27s and BM-30s).

A Songar UAV, as operated by Pakistan.
A Yiha III attack UAV, of Turkish origin, operated by Pakistan, too.

By the time, at least the India’s integrated air defence system was up and on alert. Undergoing constant development and upgrades already since the 1990s, this is one of most sophisticated such systems, world-wide. It’s integrating Russian-made S-400s (range up to 380km), with Indo-Israeli Barak-8s surface-to-air missiles (SAMs; Barak-8 has a claimed range of 70km), Indian-made Akash SAMs (25km range; this is a much improved ‘derivative’ of the 2K12 Kub/SA-6), Israeli Spyder SAMs (15km range), and lots of Bofors L70 anti-aircraft guns anti-aircraft guns calibre 40mm. Correspondingly, this attack received a ‘very hot welcome’. ‘Hundreds’ of incoming Pakistani rockets and UAVs were shot down while approaching (from north towards south): Awantipura, Srinagar, Jammu, Pathankot, Amritsar, Kapurthala, Jalandhar, Ludhiana, Adampur, Bhatinda, Chandigarh, Nal, Phalodi, Uttarlai, and Bhuj…. Sources differ whether it was ‘26’ or ‘36’ places in India that came under attack, but, and essentially, it appears it was everywhere the same: in grand total, the damage caused by Pakistani attacks appears to have been minimal (though, there was quite some damage caused to civilian objects, primarily resulting from flying debris).

BTW, it was funny to watch ‘half of India’ celebrating S-400s, where, actually, the mass of kills was scored by Akashs’, Spyders, and the good old Bofors L70 (nowadays available in form of BEL-upgraded L70s). The latter are not only famously reliable, but have a handsome engagement range. Above all – and that’s important for wars of this scope: they are far cheaper to operate than any kind of SAMs. De-facto ‘ideal’ for point defence from modern-day attack UAVs.

***

8 May 2025, Morning

For all practical purposes, this was the day the Indian Armed Forces began doing their job in serious – and with tangible results: at least they run a serious military operation, with a clear aim and the message ‘don’t play with us, we can hit you where it hurts’ – instead of ‘we want to kill a few of your terrorists, but please don’t shoot back’-business. It was also a message to China where, ironically, the social media was meanwhile in, ‘look, we kill Russian stuff operated by India, with ease’-hype.

Early that morning, the Indians have launched – apparently – their entire ‘fleet’ of around 160 Harop attack-UAVs acquired from Israel. Plus additional Warmates. This was, ‘really’, an ‘all-out strike’, and it hit very hard – irrespectively of Islamabad’s reports in style of ‘we shot down the Superman, two Death Stars and 26 Indian Harops’, or ‘it was just a scratch’. Several Harops hit the HQ of the Pakistan Army in Rawalpindi. Another few demolished the HQ of the XXX Corps Pakistan Army. But, and that was the most interesting- - and most influential, in long terms – part: three groups of Harops have each targeted one of PAF-operated battalions of Chinese HQ-9 SAMs (one in Lahore, one in Gujrat, and one in Karachi). While New Delhi claimed all three as knocked out, certain is: the one deployed in Walton, a suburb of Lahore, was largely destroyed (around 12.35hrs local time).

Detonation of the second of several Harops to hit the PAF HQ-9 SAM-site at Walton, in Lahore, around 12.35hrs local time, on 8 May 2025.

Whether it was just that one that was knocked out, or it was more: alone that blow opened a huge gap in the coverage of PAF’s ground-based air defences. As the subsequent developments were to show, I would assess the HQ-9 battalion deployed for protection of Karachi as ‘at least badly damaged’, too. Why? Because there was no trace of its activity for the rest of this conflict.

(BTW, it appears that a better part of the Indian public [mis]understood the Harop-attack on the HQ-9 SAM-site in Karachi as ‘attack & destruction of Karachi’…)

This should be a still from a HUD-camera video of a Pakistani F-16 while pursuing one of Indian Harops, early on 8 May. The symbology is not appearing ‘right’ for an F-16 to me, though (might have been taken by the Sniper targeting pod). By the evening of 8 May, official Islamabad claimed to have shot down 70 Indian UAVs – but without specifying how many of what type.

***

8 May 2025, Evening

This was the first period showing signs of ‘trouble in Islamabad’. Pakistan’s attack UAVs and Fateh-1 MLRS’ have proven ‘not enough’: the Indian IADS demonstratively shot down the mass of incoming rockets and UAVs, and Pakistan had only enough on stock for, perhaps, 2-3 days of additional strikes of that kind and scope. Moreover, Islamabad was certainly still under pressure from both the ISI and its jihadists, and it had to demonstrate to its public that ‘it’s fighting Hindu terror’: the party celebrating the ‘downing of 3 Rafales’ couldn’t go on without an end…

A Fateh-1 MLRS in position.

The question was only: with what to act and how? That’s where the decision fell to send the PAF into attack. In combination with additional Fateh-1 strikes and attack UAVs, the air force deployed ‘even’ its ‘holy’ F-16s, not to talk about JF-17s. This wave of air- and missile strikes and UAV-attacks lasted from 20.00hrs until sometimes between 23.30 and 24.00hrs. Majority of attacks were actually underataken by Songar quadcopter UAVs: these are Turkish-made, hard to detect with ‘typical’ military radars; require lighter systems calibrated for their detection, and lighter flak with proximity-fuzed ammunition to shot down.

Interestingly, I’ve found no trace of evidence for any kind of air defence- nor offensive operations of J-10Cs. Nor by Mirages upgraded to ROSE-standard. Indeed: the Pakistani media was seemingly obsessed with JF-17s… this reminded me that, just like Indian generals, so also the Pakistani generals have their own traditions and procedures. One of these is that of ‘maintaining the PAF as a force in being’ – no matter what’s going on. We’ve seen that already back in 1971, when they, de-facto, grounded the PAF, to avoid losses in the face of obvious Indian supremacy, and ‘as reserve, should things really get very, very bad’. Wouldn’t be surprised if they did the same now, too – at least with units operating J-10s, Mirages etc.

And so… the F-16s and JF-17s went in: some of the latter armed with (Chinese-made) CM-400AKG air-launched, ballistic anti-radar missiles. Islamabad promptly claimed ‘destruction’ of an Indian S-400 (while India claimed it intercepted both of incoming CM-400s). How do they think they’ve destroyed an entire battalion of S-400s with anti-radar missiles, though: is beyond my comprehension. But hey: the claim sounds so cool, so why not…?

A PAF JF-17 armed with one CM-400 anti-radar missile (the latter is visible to the left, i.e. under the jet’s right/starboard inboard underwing pylon).

In turn, the Indians claimed – as far as I can assess – the downing of one F-16 and two JF-17s. A few unofficial Indian social media presences claimed the capture of one of PAF pilots. Of course, this was promptly denied by official Islamabad. Moreover, mulitple Indian UAVs have hit the Kamra AB (home-base of PAF J-10s).

Alpha Design-made SkyStriker attack UAVs (developed in cooperation with Elbit Security Systems) were reportedly deployed in several strikes on Pakistan of 7, 8 and 9 May 2025. They have a 100km range and a warhead of 5-10kg.

Particularly ironic: later on, stories surfaced about some of involved Pakistani F-16-pilots ‘signing their last will’ before that operation. Kind of, ‘they were sure they are not going to survive it’. Well, boys and girls: sad fact is that all the pilots are signing their last will when going to a war. At least as long as serving in professional armed services.

A video-still supposedly showing a group of Indian Army troops with a ‘captured PAF pilot’, late on 8 May. Erm… sorry: no idea who there should be who, so can’t say what to think of it.

Targets of this operation remain largely unclear. For example, official New Delhi reported that Pakistan launched eight attack UAVs on Satwari (airport), Samba, Pura, and Arnia in Jammu & Kashmir, and that over 50 UAVs and rockets were intercepted over this area alone.. A PAF F-16 was differently claimed as ‘shot down over Jaisalmer’ or ‘…Pathankot’ (by SAM). Two JF-17s were claimed as shot down over Akhnoor and Pathankot, also by SAMs. The number of PAF pilots in Indian custody was eventually reported with ‘two’ (supposedly, their names were Commander/Commodore Chahat Fateh Ali Khan and Captain Syed Qaim Ali Shah), but this remains unconfirmed.

How successful was this PAF ‘retaliation’ operation… no trace of clue. Pending the release of any kind of related details, one might want to judge it by the fact that immediately after, official Islamabad began talking about Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates supporting Pakistan; Turkey sending additional attack drones… and the local media publishing lots of praise about Pakistan and the PAF. See: somebody was in (urgent?) need of positive confirmation and ‘international support’. The Chinese were still busy mocking the Indians all over the social media…while Indian hackers obliterated numerous official Pakistani websites and online systems (including the Federal Board of Revenue).

***

9 May

Reconstructing the events of this day is nothing but trouble. Essentially, both the PR China and Pakistan went into ‘all out mode’, oversaturating the social media with boasting about the downing of ‘5 Indian fighters’ two days earlier. So much so, yet another claim for an IAF Rafale - supposedly shot down in the Srinagar area late on 9 May - kind of ‘went under’ in all the hysteria… just like an Indian claim for the IAF to have felled a ‘PAF AWACS’ (i.e. a Saab 2000) by a SAM (should that mean ‘S-400’?)… or that several PL-15s missed and crashed inside India after targeting a formation of Su-30MKIs (indeed, a single Su-30MKI should have managed to dodge no less than 8 HQ-9 and PL-15 missiles).

Thus, sorry but: collection and sort of combat-related reporting is still going on.

Wreckage of one of PL-15s fired during what some of unofficial Indian sources claim was ‘the biggest exchange of beyond-visual range air-to-air missiles ever’, fought sometimes early on 9 May. This missile flew all the way to India. Contrary to Indian claims, though, it’s not ‘nearly intact’: actually, half the missile (seeker head and warhead) are missing: visiable are (from left to right) propulsion section, and the data-link and INS-section (with both fins and wings, of course).

A still from a video of wreckage inspected by a group of Indian Army troops in rugged, forest-covered terrain - showing pieces of an Atar 9 engine. Although the troops on the video in question are talking about' ‘Indian Su-30’, this engine is making the jet in question a PAF Mirage. (Arguably, no matter where, infantrymen are not renowned for their ID-skills of aircraft - not to talk about thier ID-skills in pieces of wreckage like jet engines.)

***

10 May 2025, Morning

By now, Islamabad was in serious trouble: Pakistani UAVs, Fateh-1s, and the PAF didn’t manage to knock out the Indian air defences, nor to impress New Delhi. Own stocks of UAVs and Fateh-1s were running low (at least one flight of a commercial transport aircraft from Islamabad to Turkey was recorded by the Flightradar24.com), while claims about destruction of the mass of the IAF’s stocks of Brahmos missiles proved yet more of unsubstantiated (though usual) Pakistani bragging. Not one of IAF air bases is known to have been closed for operations, either.

On the contrary, during the night the IAF re-appeared on the scene to launch a number of Brahmos and SCALP-EG missiles against selected bases of the Pakistan Air Force. With at least two of PAF’s HQ-9s knocked out two days earlier, and the PAF suppressed enough to stop shooting PL-15s into the Indian airspace, in a matter of three hours the IAF Su-30MKI-, Mirage 2000- and Rafale-crews found enough opportunities to deliver a few really heavy blows. For example,

- Nur Khan AB (Islamabad, an air base housing a number of PAF transport units), was hit and a C-130 Hercules of the PAF set on fire.

- Mushaf AB (Sargodha, home-base of a number of PAF units) received at least one hit that cratered the centre of the runway.

- Bholari AB (Sind province, home-base of No. 53 Squadron PAF, operating Saab 2000), received at least one direct hit into its main hangar; this killed Squadron Leader Usman and four others, injured more than 40, and damaged one of Saab 2000s. Immediately after, the same hangar was hit by four Indian attack UAVs, too.

- Shahbaz AB (outside Jacobabad, base of PAF F-16C Block 52s), yet another main hangar demolished…

A silhouette of a PAF C-130 set afire at the Nur Khan AB is clearly visible on this still from a video.

That (notorious) itch in my small toe tells me that the main hangar at the Shahbaz AB, outside Jacobabad, is not meant to look like this. Thus, that structure was probably also hit by one or several of Indian missiles.

How many PAF aircraft were destroyed in these strikes remains unknown: don’t worry, the Pakistanis are not going to brag about that number (until today, even official PAF historians simply prefer to ignore all of PAF losses in the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War). Fact is, after this series of blows, the writing was on the wall: pending the IAF exhausting its stocks of Brahmos and SCALP-EGs, Pakistan had nothing left to counter these.

This became obvious when Jaguar DARIN fighter-bombers of the IAF deployed Israeli-made Rampage missiles to strike the Sukkur AB, while somebody/something else blew up both entrances to the underground nuclear storage site at the Mushaf AB (Sarghoda complex) in the Kirma Hills:

Additionally, when - around 04.00hrs in the morning, local time - several PAF figher-bombers appraoched the border area, two were claimed as shot down by Indian SAMs in the Srinagar area, and one in the Baramulla-Budgam area. Around the same time, also a number of Fateh-1 and Fateh-2 artillery rockets were intercepted by Akash and Barak-8 SAMs over Sirsa.

Now, India and Pakistan maintain a direct ‘hotline’ between Islamabad and New Delhi. This is similar to what the USA and the USSR were doing during the times of the Cold War. Thus, around 09.00hrs, Pakistan’s Director General of Military Operations, Major-General Kashif Abdullah, used that hotline to call India’s Director General of Military Operations, Lieutenant-General Rajiv Ghal, and ‘sound’ a cease-fire. Ghal didn’t accept a cease-fire: rather agreed to stop shooting at Pakistan at 17.00hrs local time.

AFAIK, this happened at least few hours before anybody there in Islamabad began ‘sabre rattling with nukes’ (related statements seems to have been withdrawn, subsequently), and two hours before Dumpf’s administration became involved with its own calls (to both Islamabad and New Delhi). And even if the USA did anything, then they’ve advised Abdhullah to call Ghal… Thus, sorry, but I have my doubts about anybody from the outside playing any kind of a ‘crucial’ role in bringing this affair to its end.

***

What can be concluded about this all?

Well, whatever one likes. Indeed, if you like, join the Pakistanis (and such instances like the CNN), and celebrate a ‘victory’, as their Prime Minister has announced. No doubt, many of Indians are feeling angry because their impression is that their government ‘did not finish the job’ – even if it could.

But, mind: New Delhi has switched its strategy, and henceforth, Pakistan must expect similar – military – response to any kind of additional terror attacks into India. Pakistan’s deterrent has failed: actually, now it’s non-existing (especially if the Indians continue improving their stocks of air defence ammunition). The fighting also stopped without Islamabad at least trying to address the issue of New Delhi’s suspension of the Indus Water Treaty. Whether Beijing might ‘rush’ to replace Pakistani losses and the expenditure of ammunition is also questionable: I don’t think this is likely to happen – except ‘somebody’ (read: Qatar) pays.

In regards of military affairs… Contrary to the war in Ukraine, this war was still fought primarily with technologies from the 1990s, with some upgrades to the 2000s. Sure, both India and Pakistan have ‘decent’ integrated air defence systems (IADS), and have deployed attack UAVs in large numbers. However, and despite significant upgrades over the last 20 years (and especially the last 10 years), what they have deployed are heavy, expensive systems based on technologies from the late 20th Century. Except for self-imposed constraints (on the Indian side), the mindsets of generals in both countries are also still some 10-15 years ‘behind’. That’s why both are yet to fully adjust to latest developments. Indeed, it’s likely that precisely this ‘detail’ contributed to Pakistan’s decision not only not to escalate any further, but to stop: due to insufficient stocks, its armed forces were about to run out of only types of ammunition that have proven as being of any use – like attack UAVs - ‘even’ in such a short conflict like this one.

Yes, Pakistan used the last few years better than India, and not only obtained ‘platforms’ (foremost: aircraft): it also improved its electronic warfare capabilities, and acquired software necessary to better integrate its weaponry. However, the PAF – just like the rest of Pakistani Armed Forces – is sorely lacking long-range land-attack weapons. Despite all the claims and boasting, they either have no, or far too few missiles that can hit with pinpoint precision over a range of 300-400km. Definitely nothing comparable to India’s Brahmos and SCALP-EG. Unless Pakistan finds a way to manufacture something in style of Iran’s Shaheed attack-UAVs, and then in huge numbers, that’s unlikely to change soon. In this regards, Pakistani generals have ‘missed the train’.

At least the PAF can nowadays fight ‘network centric warfare’: it is perfectly possible (even likely) that the Pakistani Navy can do the same; only the Pakistani Army is an uncertain factor in this regards. On the contrary, and with exception of its air defences, India undertook far too little in this regards. Especially the IAF is still sorely lagging behind: presently, it’s not even certain it’s much-announced acquisition of secure radios and a system enabling network-centric warfare from Israel has been applied fleet-wide, or (though far more likely) only to a part of its fighter-bomber-fleet. That said, once the Indians did a ‘reset’ of their command and control, and ‘started from the scratch’ – by knocking out the Pakistani air defences – their conduct of operations became much better. Foremost: it became professional and remained focused on what matters. Like knocking out the PAF air defences and the PA’s artillery. When one is running such an operation in well-organised fashion, positive results are unavoidable. In comparison, the Pakistani conduct began degenerating into targeting religious sites (like Amritsar, with holy sites of the Sikh), and pointless claims about ‘destruction of S-400 in Adampur – as if destroying one S-400 SAM-system could’ve completely turned the outcome of this round.

Above all, intelligence services on both sides have failed (and miserably at that) to find out about and report major developments, while generals on both sides have displayed their usual lack of imagination, and stolid conservativism in overall planning and conduct of operations. Nobody there in India or Pakistan dares undertaking anything risky – because that could become a mistake. Unsurprisingly, one thing remains the same, that’s certain already now: in the vocabulary of the Indian Armed forces, all of this was a ‘cross-border incident’. No ‘war’…

Last but not least: not only India, but ‘the West’ might want to – finally – start taking PR Chinese-made weapons systems much more seriously than they are still usually doing.

That’s about it for this ‘round’ - from me and, I guess, from India and Pakistan, too. Thanks for reading all of this.

***

ADD-ON in reaction to a number of related querries: frankly (as always), can't care less about PR-efforts by CNN & Co KG GesmbH AG, about New Delhi's insistence on ‘we’re a responsible democracy and thus can’t declare military victories’, and even less so about Western 'military Experten'.

When one side is bombing nuclear weapons storage facilities of the other, and the other has no ability to retaliate left, then that's a clear cut victory in my books.

In this case: a clear-cut victory for India.

No surprise Islamabad 'sounded' for a 'cease-fire'.

‍The text is published with the permission of the author. First published here.

Related Articles