(…continued from Part 1…)

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Q: Indian Mirage-2000 nosecones are painted black, and the nosecone wreckage looks slimmer and pointier than that of a JF-17. Additionally, the paint scheme on that refuelling probe matches what one sees on Indian Mirage-2000s.

I’ve received several similar questions (by few Pakistani academics, too), so also from people who belittle the use of hand-drawn colour profiles in (every single of) @War books (see attachment).

Sorry but…

a) read any of related @War books (and there are enough of these in the Asia@War series; link are available below):

b) spend days studying photos of IAF's Mirage 2000Hs upgraded to the Mirage 2000I standard, and Mirage 2000THs upgraded to the Mirage 2000TI standard, instead of

c) belittling the use of colour profiles in @War books as 'non-academic', and/or

d) at least check such a simply-available 'universal source of reference' like the Wikipedia, to find out that, yes, originally Mirage 2000H/THs delivered to India used to have black noses, but meanwhile this is simply not the case anymore.

Since their upgrade to Mirage 2000I/TI standard (which is making them equal to Mirage 2000-5 Mk2), Indian jets of this type have new, grey radomes (as usual for any jets of this type equipped with the RDY radar). Nope, the radome is not 'just re-painted': even the construction and materials used on the original radome are different in comparison to the new radome.

Another thingy based on experience with 'wasting thousands of hours with drawing colour profiles’ (like those attached below) of modern-day combat aircraft is that nowadays, colours used on such aircraft are adapting their 'shade' to the light. Means: the darker the surrounding, the darker the colours get (and the other way around). Unsurprisingly, a 'dark grey' radome of JF-17s gets 'almost black' by night... (and NO: this is not done on ‘the push on a button’, but these colours are doing so, de-facto, ‘on their own’).

...all of which is not to talk about an entirely different position in which the in-flight-refuelling (IFR) -probes are installed on JF-17Cs, in comparison to where they are installed on Mirage 2000Is: there is no ‘camouflage pattern’ on such probes; those on Indian jets are thinner, dark in colour, and installed in front of the cockpit, those on JF-17Cs are installed right next to the cockpit (and painted in the same ghost grey colour as most of the airframe) exactly like on the wreckage visible on the video in question…

Upper line: Mirage 2000I serial numbers KF107 and KF104, as they appeared already around the time of the Balakot strikes, and subsequent 'ruffle' with the PAF, back in February 2019. Obviously, both have been upgraded to the Mirage 2000-5-standard, thus received the RDY radar with its new, grey radome. Bottom line: Mirage 2000TH as of the times of the Kargil War, in 1999, still with its original, black radome: meanwhile, during its upgrade to the Mirage 2000TI standard, this was replaced by a grey radome. Finally, lower right corner, a PAF JF-17 Block II (sorry, haven’t found the time to draw any JF-17C Block III yet).

A good example for how dark the grey colour of the JF-17 can appear - always depending on the ambient light (which, in this case, is low, as the photo was taken on sunset). …and that’s then not to talk about colour distortion caused by video takes, very varrying calibration of cameras installed into smartphones, then the calibration of PC-monitors and laptops...

...but then, studying colours applied on combat aircraft, or such details about positions of IFR-probes, not to talk about drawing authentic colour profiles - is 'ah-so-too-enthusiast-alike', and (also using them in @War books) so 'non-academic', right?

With other words: sorry for my sarcasm, but this is so pointless to discuss, can’t say.

Here’s my offer (and, even more so: an offer from my publisher, Helion & Co): follow the link https://www.helion.co.uk/series/asiaatwar.php. Presently, all the Asia@War books about Indo-Pakistani conflict (like Terror and Response, 90 Years of the Indian Air Force, Eagles of Destiny, Against all Odds etc.), are on offer. Do all of us a favour: buy one, inform yourself. You’re not going to be disappointed (not even in regards of ‘that’ with the correct colour of radomes on IAF Mirages and PAF JF-17s since 2019).

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Q: Do you think not finishing PAF would come to haunt India in future?

Sorry, I have no capabilities to predict future, so can’t say (if you like: that’s my ‘standard answer’ to all such and similar questions). I am assessing available information.

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Q: Could the PAF learn its lessons to plug the gaps exposed?

That’s an issue on the Pakistani capability to soberly analyse. Gauging by their bragging about ‘victory’, acts like advancing Munir in rank to Field-Marshal and similar, and the PAF’s traditional inability to cross-examine its own claims for aerial victories (or lack of interest in doing that), but decorating pilots to the left and right: right now, such capability is non-existent. With other words: the service is unlikely to learn any really useful lessons.

On the other hand: one should never gauge future actions of armed services based on obvious PR-efforts of the political leadership. Thus, perhaps the PAF is going to find enough sober officers to draw at least a few useful lessons.

BTW, talking about Munir and his advancement in rank: think that is a particularly interesting issue – for the Indian intelligence. Appointing him such a high rank (AFAIK, he’s only the second Pakistani general ever to become a Field Marshal), is likely to be of very high importance for his standing vis-à-vis the political establishment, but also within circles of the ISI-Jihadists-coalition.

I would go as far as to say that this is likely to make Munir more important than either the president or the prime minister of Pakistan: he’s definitely ‘untouchable’ for anybody else in the country.

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Now to V. Ganesh’s questions…

Q: Is it true that the Indian Air Force [IAF] has lesser numbers of AEW&C/AWACS aircraft in comparison to the Pakistani Air Force [PAF]?

AFAIK, yes. The IAF is operating 3 A-50Is and 3 Netra Mk. Is. As mentioned above, the PAF is operating (at least) 9 Saab 2000s (minus 1-2, depends on how many were shot down, as claimed by India, and how many damaged on the ground)and 4 ZDK-03s.

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Q: Are the IAF's Soviet Union/USSR/Russian-origin Beriev A-50 and Brazilian-origin Embraer ERJ-145 Nethra AEW&C/AWACS aircraft inferior to their PAF counterparts?

In terms of their radar/sensor-equipment, and their software, I consider all these types ‘equal’. Where the IAF-operated types are possessing an advantage is the level of their integration into the India’s IACCS integrated air defence system (i.e. their capability to exchange information in real time), and in being jet-powered, which is making them faster (which, in these times of ever longer-ranged air-to-air missiles is of crucial importance for their survivability).

Additionally, A-50I is a much bigger aircraft than the other three types, offering more space for growth, more space for electronic equipment. Where the IAF seems to be lagging is in regards of their cooperative targeting capability: apparently, the IAF can’t run such operations except by its Rafales (i.e. one Rafale can assume the guidance of a Meteor air-to-air missile from another, but, as far as is known, neither A-50I nor Netra can guide Meteors).

Considering that RUMINT (‘rumours intelligence’) has it that the French are still not ready to share source codes for Rafales delivered to India, it is probably so that the IAF will have no other option but to let the DRDO develop an entirely new, longer-ranged air-to-air missile than the Astra Mk. I, with cooperative targeting capability from A-50I and/or Netra (probably the Netra Mk. II, to become available in around 2029).

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Q: The reason for this question is, I've read on the web that US/Western-origin military hardware are more expensive, have a longer life and less expensive to maintain, whereas Soviet Union/USSR/Russian-origin military hardware is less expensive, have a short life and are more expensive to maintain.

Generally, yes, the ‘Western’ military hardware is more expensive in acquisition, more complex and more expensive in maintenance and operation, but made to last longer than either Soviet/Russian or Chinese hardware.

This is based on the fact that back in the times of the USSR, the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces expected to fight high-intensive, but short wars, in which items like combat aircraft were considered for ‘expendables’. A short version of the reason was that their studies of the Second World War (and they insisted on basing their assessments about future warfare on drawing lessons from that conflict until very recently) have shown that the average operational life of a tactical combat aircraft is something like 120 hours. Therefore, they saw no point in designing and manufacturing a combat aircraft that would last for much longer than that. In that way, the cost of their aircraft was kept low, too, which in turn made them available in higher numbers. Furthermore, the Soviet maintenance practices were fundamentally different to those in ‘the West’. Their aircraft could be maintained in operational condition with minimal effort ‘in the field’ (i.e. at their air bases): by personnel that received only minimal training, and with few specialised tools. They also required relatively few ‘spare parts’: actually, in most of cases, there were no ‘spare parts’ for them, but entire assemblies and sub-assemblies (good example: cockpit transparencies were not available as separate ‘parts’ but only in condition of ‘already installed into the cockpit frame, together with insulation’).

In turn, such aircraft could be intensively operated for 120, then 200, perhaps 400 hours (this period was gradually increased, the longer the Cold War went on), but after that, they required complete re-building (so-called ‘overhaul’). Arguably, some of more recent Russian aircraft types (and/or their engines) can be operated for up to 600-800 or even more hours, but the essence remains the same: after this, they have to be returned to the factory and completely re-built.

The Western practices were significantly different: field units were expected to undertake much more maintenance on their own, and periods between major overhauls were much longer. This required far better training of their ground crews, and a more complex support infra-structure (tools, workshops etc.), which in turn made that aspect of operations more expensive. In turn, they last much longer (check F-4 Phantom IIs as a ‘classic’ example).

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Q: You've also mentioned about China mocking India on social media with regards to Operation Sindoor. Don't you think it's rich and hypocritical? Because the Chinese have copied/stolen/reverse engineered/made unauthorised copies of Soviet Union/USSR/Russian-origin military hardwares [which are used in a major way by India and China too], along with copying/stealing US/Israeli [the IAI Lavi fighter jet blueprints which the Israelis sold to China to recover their investment in it after being forced by the US to buy the Lockheed Martin F-16 Fighting Falcon] military technologies like the one used for the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II and the last war that China fought was against Vietnam which it lost.

Hand on heart: does that matter?

Fact is that already the experiences from the collision of a Shenyang J-8 interceptor of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), with a Lockheed EP-3 Aries reconnaissance aircraft of the US Navy, back in April 2001, should have taught everybody what to expect from the ‘Chinese internet’ if the PRC gets involved (no matter if directly or indirectly). They’re mocking, they’re belittling, they’re damning, they’re posting sad stories about the widow of the killed PLAAF pilot crying herself ‘to death’ and everything else….

…just like ‘the Westerners’ do, like Pakistanis are doing, and like Indians are meanwhile doing: like everybody is doing…

That’s the ‘social media’.

The same is valid for way the PRC has obtained its knowledge about the high-tech necessary to design and make their modern combat aircraft. Whether they ‘copied’ the Lavi, or the Israelis sold them its design (which, actually, was developed by Grumman of the USA), whether they’ve copied the Erieye, or stole its material- and technical specifications: it doesn’t matter. Fact is: they’ve learned – immensely, and one way or the other - and they’re going to continue learning from such and similar affairs in the future too. That is why the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) maintains presence of its military attaches all over the world: they’re constantly collecting all the possible data on requirements of the local armed forces, and about latest combat experiences in particular (and that’s not to talk about activities of the PRC’s intelligence services).

From that point of view: it also does not matter whether the last war fought by the PLA was the one against Vietnam of 1979. What does matter is how much is the local industry, and how much is the PLA capable of absorbing the knowledge collected from abroad, and applying it in practice. Alone gauging from (massive) progress of their industry and armed services just over the last 10 years: one better has no doubts in this regards and takes the PRC seriously.

….so also the PRC’s ‘social media warfare’.

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Q: Is it true that the Pakistani Air Force [PAF] Lockheed Martin F-16 Fighting Falcon fighter jet shot down by the Indian Air Force [IAF] fighter pilot, now-Wing Commander, Abhinandan Varthaman was in fact a Royal Jordanian Air Force [RJAF] loaned by Jordan to to Pakistan for use by the Pakistani Air Force [PAF]. I think I've a good reason to ask this, because the Pakistani Air Force [PAF] and the Government of the United States of America [GOUSA] after the 2019 Balakot airstrike by India claimed that all Pakistani Air Force [PAF] Lockheed Martin F-16 Fighting Falcon fighter jets were accounted for?

To the best of my knowledge: nope.

AFAIK, this story is based on the fact that back during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, the Royal Jordanian Air Force sent many of its Lockheed F-104A Starfighters to Pakistan, to bolster the PAF. And that at least one of jets in question was then shot down by MiG-21s of the Indian Air Force. (BTW, this transfer was undertaken with US permission, because the aircraft were still US-possession and ‘merely leased’ to Jordan.) You can find intricate details about this affair both in Against all Odds and in Eagles of Destiny Volume 2.

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Q: Is it possible or did the Royal Jordanian Air Force [RJAF] or maybe any other Islamic/Muslim/Arab including anti-India Air Force [AF] which operates the Lockheed Martin F-16 Fighting Falcon fighter jet given Pakistan's history of overt and covert military support to mainly the Islamic Muslim Arab nations in their war on the Jewish Zionist State of Israel including by sending covert Pakistani Air Force [PAF] fighter pilots flying Islamic Muslim Arab nations Air Force [AF] fighter jets in their war on the Jewish Zionist State of Israel's Israeli Air Force [IAF] loan in 2025 one of their Lockheed Martin F-16 Fighting Falcon fighter jets to the Pakistani Air Force [PAF] due to claims of a Pakistani Air Force [PAF] Lockheed Martin F-16 Fighting Falcon fighter jet having been shot down by the Indian Air Force [IAF] and or the Indian Army [IAF] using either or the Indian Air Force [IAF] fighter jets on their own or in coordination with the Indian Air Force [IAF] and the Indian Army [IA] individual and combined Air Defence System[s]?

It's ‘theoretically possible’, but practice is fundamentally different.

Pakistan firing US-made AIM-120C-7s over the Line of Control in 2019, is ‘one pair of shoes’. If for no other reason, then because Wing Commander Varthaman ‘violated a few unwritten rules’ when crossing the LOC into the Pakistan-controlled airspace and then opened fire at PAF F-16s. However, ‘firing air-to-air missiles over the LOC’ is an entirely different pair of shoes to ‘sending F-16s to Pakistan’. Any foreign air force (i.e. government) that might come up with such ideas like sending its F-16s to Pakistan, first has to obtain a US permission to do so.

I do not think this would be very realistic, though: there are limits of the US support for Pakistan (just like there are limits of the Chinese support for Pakistan).

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Q: Was this claim a secret understanding or agreement between the USA and Pakistan as a face-saver for both including exclusively for the USA which needs India to defeat China and since 2008 its military hardware sales to India [apart from Lockheed Martin pitching their India-specific variant of the Lockheed Martin F-16 Fighting Falcon as the Lockheed Martin F-21 for the Indian Air Force [IAF]'s Request For Proposal [RFP] for 114 Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft [MMRCA], due to the USA having failed to sell any fighter aircraft/jet to India since the end of the Cold War and from the start of the new millennium in the 2000s] have increased from the almost non-existent state of theirs until the end of the Cold War?

Never heard of this, and I doubt this is the case.

Sure, for years already, the USA are pitching the Lockheed-Martin F-16s and, more recently, Lockheed-Martin F-35s to India. However, that’s not about ‘USA didn’t sell any fighter aircraft to India in ages’: the USA never sold any fighter aircraft to India at all. The USA did supply a big fleet of Fairchild C-119 Packet transports to India after this was defeated in the war against the PRC, back in 1962 – though even then: also in exchange for India secretly granting rights for CIA’s operations against the PRC, from the Indian soil. For example, for Lockheed U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft launching some of their overflights of the PRC from India (see either We were Never There, Volume 1, or We were Never There, Volume 2). Plus: New Delhi was ‘tolerating’ US secret operations in support of Tibetan resistance (details in the book CIA Paramilitary Operations in Tibet, 1957-1975).

Now, perhaps different private persons came up with such ideas as you have described them… like when, sometimes back in 2020 or 2021, few super-clever retired generals came to the idea to deliver Boeing B-52 bombers to Israel, so this would ‘go bombing Russia on behalf of Ukraine’… (by best will, but: this is really something only very specific, ‘selected’ group of US-Americans can come up with).

However, the US governments simply do not think ‘that complex’, nor ‘that far’ as to now go plotting super-secret ops to pitch fighter jets to New Delhi so India would go fighting the PRC.

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Q: India said it hit Islamabad. Since the Pakistani military intelligence organisation, the Inter-Services Intelligence [ISI] Head Quarters [HQ] is located in the Aabpara area of Islamabad, was the Inter-Services Intelligence [ISI] Head Quarters [HQ] also hit?

Haven’t heard of official claims from New Delhi to have targeted ‘Islamabad’. Though, if they did so, yes, sure: ISI HQ in Aabpara would be one of ‘priority targets’. Nothing’s sending as clear a message as striking that kind of facilities does.

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Q: Is it true that when India hit the Pakistani Air Force [PAF] Nur Khan Air Base near Islamabad, the Pakistani Army [PA] Chief Of Army Staff [COAS], General Syed Asim Munir Ahmed Shah was taken to a fortified bunker within the Pakistani Army [PA]'s General Head Quarters [GHQ] and that he hid there for around 2 hours?

Don’t know, but this does sound plausible: i.e. it would be something like ‘standard procedure’ to take care for the top commander to be brought to safety when nearby HQs are targeted.

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Q: When India hit the Pakistani Air Force [PAF]'s Nur Khan Air Force Base [AFB] near Islamabad, it is said on the web, that the Pakistani Air Force [PAF]'s Nur Khan Air Force Base [AFB] is in close proximity to the Armed Forces of Pakistan [AFP]'s Strategic Plans Division [SPD] which is the custodian of Pakistan's nuclear weapons arsenal. Was the Armed Forces of Pakistan [AFP]'s Strategic Plans Division [SPD] also hit?

I have heard several very confusing claims/reports about India striking such a facility. In/around Islamabad, and/or in Gujranwala. Have seen no evidence this has actually happened, though.

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Q: The Director-General of Air Operations [DGAO], Air Marshal A. K. Bharti during the Director-General of Military Operations [DGMO] press conference on Monday, May 12, 2025 kind of sarcastically replied to a journalist's question about Kirana Hills that India didn't hit Kirana Hills and that India didn't know that Kirana Hills had Pakistan's nuclear weapons and thanked the journalist for telling him that. What do you make of it?

When reading this for the first time, I was surprised, because evidence was obvious: a video released in the Pakistani social-media was easily geo-located and confirmed a strike on two, perhaps even three entrances into underground facilities in the Kirana Hills complex (north-western sector of the same).

Since seeing a video of that press-conference, I’m sure it was sarcasm.

Contrary to its obligations, Islamabad never officially announced the existence of that facility in that place. Thus, ‘we did not know it was there… thanks for informing me.’

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Q: On 16 May, 2025, on the Indian English TV news channel, CNN-News18, I saw the interview of Major General R. Narayanan [Retired], the former Additional Director-General of Military Operations [ADGMO] who said that India hit the entrance and exit points in Kirana Hills thereby trapping the Pakistani nuclear weapons inside there. He also said that when Pakistan tries to clear this, India will hit again. By hit again, he meant that during such a hit, when the enemy nation tries to clear the entrance and exit of such a location, the enemy's enemy hits again, which in this case will be India. Is this true?

AFAIK, two-, possibly three Brahmos have hit as many entrances into one or more of underground facilities assessed – ever since their construction became known, back in 2017 – as serving the purpose of being underground nuclear weapons storage facilities. Extent of resulting damage is unknown to me: can only assume that the Indian intelligence services are carefully monitoring what’s going on there. Whether New Delhi then called Islamabad to order the Pakistanis not even to think about trying to re-open the entrances to the facilities in question: as much as this sounds logical (especially in the light of Islamabad’s behaviour since that strike), sorry, no idea.

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Q: Did India's hit on the Pakistani Air Force [PAF] Nur Khan Air Force Base [AFB] along with the Armed Forces of Pakistan [AFP]'s Strategic Plans Division [SPD] in close proximity to it also getting hit and the Pakistani Army [PA] Chief Of Army Staff [COAS], General Syed Asim Munir Ahmed Shah having to hid in a fortified bunker within the Pakistani Army [PA]'s General Head Quarters [GHQ] for around 2 hours make the Pakistani Army [PA]'s Director-General of Military Operations [DGMO], Major General Kashif Abdullah Chaudhry call the Indian Army [IA]'s Director-General of Military Operations [DGMO], Lieutenant General Rajiv Ghai and request for a ceasefire on Saturday, May 10, 2025?

I do not think it was these strikes (or at least the strike on the PAF mobile, trailer-mounted HQ at Nur Khan AB, which is visually confirmed as completely obliterated), that had such an impact. As explained again and again, me thinks, the ‘secret of India’s success’ was the ‘Kirana Hills Affair’.

A strike on one or another of Pakistan’s headquarters is never sending such an ‘obvious message’ as when one hits entrances to one of its underground nuclear weapons storage facilities. The essence of that obvious message is: ‘we are this sure about our superiority, and you better do not think about doing that’.

Keep also the effects of such a message in mind: ‘now you’re disarmed, game over, and a clear-cut victory for India’. One can ‘properly shake a general’, but not achieve anything even roughly similar by striking any kind of headquarters.

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Hope, this was of some interest and is helping at least a notch further.

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This text is published with the permission of the author. First published here.